SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT TERRITORY AND SCHOLARSHIP:

THE BIRTHRIGHT OF EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGY

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At the end of the Introduction, we invited our readers to join us in our reflections about the relationship between geographic location and scholarship in the field of organization studies. We shared with you our letter of invitation to the contributors, in which we speculated that it is an appropriate time to investigate the real or mythical nature of the belief that there exists a unique European tradition in our field. We hope that you have read these chapters and compared them with your own set of images about what the European tradition of organization studies is all about. We suggested that you try to use these chapters as a form of data, searching them for recurrent themes, traits, stances, and methodologies, and looking between the lines for each author's interpretation of what it means to present oneself as a European scholar. In this chapter, we present the results of our own attempt to follow that advice.

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As we said in the Introduction, we began this project with a number of conversations with European and American scholars of organizations, asking them what they consider distinctively European in organization studies. As a result of these conversations, we can say that the two images share many substantial traits, but are shaped differently. The American image of Europeans seems quite clear-cut, defined more in terms of what they do than in terms of who they are, and is generally contrasted with the American way of doing social research. European scholars, asked to say what they consider distinctively European in organization studies, talk less of concrete "ways of doing" and more of attitudes and concerns. The resulting image is more fluid, less clear-cut and less concrete than the Americans' image of Europeans.

On the whole, the self-image of European organizational scholars seems quite consistent with the image that Americans have of Europeans, although it is expressed differently and accentuates different aspects of what it means to be European. Four general themes emerged from those conversations, reflecting European attitudes toward disciplinary specialization, the contexts of organizations, epistemologies, and the uniqueness of their styles of research and empirical referents.

EUROPEAN ECLECTICISM AND MULTI-DISCIPLINARITY

Several European organization scholars suggested that Europeans tend to view themselves as less specialized within the boundaries of narrow academic disciplines, and instead are more apt to consider themselves to be general intellectuals who apply disciplinary thinking across academic boundaries. Here are some sample quotes from those interviews.

> We are more sensitive to the relationship between different disciplines and fields.
>
> We work more on the interstices.
>
> We try more often to take some distance from narrow specialization, to compensate this with more open intellectual and cultural attitudes (think of the importance of the "maitre a penser"—master of thinking—in the European culture, think of the influence of semiotics, hermeneutics and philosophy in the social sciences).
>
> ...more able to use a truly interdisciplinary approach: for instance, what in the U.S. is called organizational culture—and is in fact anthropology applied to formal organizations—in Europe is called organizational symbolism, viewed as the attempt to study organizations through categories borrowed from linguistics, literary criticism, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, and so on.

These quotations give us an image of an eclectic approach to the study of organizations, with a strong reliance on the various European intellectual traditions.

This image is certainly consistent with the American image of European social science as being grounded in philosophy and concerned with their intellectual heritage. For example, "European organizational thought is more frequently and evidently influenced by general intellectual trends like Marxism, post-modernism, cognitivism, constructivism, etc." It is also consistent with the American image of Europeans as being concerned with grand theories while Americans are concerned with theories of the middle range.

EUROPEAN TENDENCY TO PUT ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIETAL CONTEXT

Another dimension of the European self-image revealed by the interviews is that they "are more able to contextualize, to see the object of the study in a broader context." One typical American response to this quote is to dismiss it. Indeed, for the last thirty years, some of the major American schools of thought in organizational theory have emphasized the impact of the environment on organizations. However, there seems to be a subtle but important difference centered around the difference between the American notion of environment and the European notion of "broader context."

For the Europeans, the broader context seems to mean the broader political, ideological, social, and cultural context, translated not in terms of specific variables, but rather in terms of broad impact. This is probably related to the Europeans' tendency toward multi-disciplinary eclecticism and their preference for grand theories over middle-range theories. While Europeans tend to use broader theories, Americans carefully delineate the relationship between certain variables measuring aspects of the organization context and certain other variables measuring behavior or structure in organizations. That is, for the Europeans, the context is a multiple geist, while for Americans it is, for instance, multiple markets. For example, one of the scholars interviewed claimed that in Europe, there is an interest in pursuing broader and more ambiguous studies of "the impact of industrial work and organization on individual and social life," whereas in the United States, one might study the impact of the munificence of a labor market on individual career choices.

EUROPEAN AMBIGUITY AND SOPHISTICATION ABOUT EPISTEMOLOGY

The above differences are accentuated by a certain European ambiguity and sophistication about issues of epistemology. Generally, Europeans are cast as less obsessed than Americans with the "science" of the study of society, with its strong belief in the universality of general principles which can be tested empirically through the operationalization of concepts through variables. The

American version of sociology has often been cast as historically more obsessed with variables than constructs and more obsessed with constructs than with grand theory.

This American obsession with constructs and variables can be seen in the Americans' use of the works of Max Weber. Americans use Weber in a manner that permits them to generate or build a "scientific" discipline. From Weber they take the discussion of objectivity and the need for it as legitimization of the need for an empirical science. From Weber they also take the belief that understanding causality, while difficult, is an achievable goal. Even in the case of Weber's theory of social action, such a subjective phenomenon as "meaningful social action" was adopted by Parsons and became the foundation of formalistic functionalism.

While some Europeans assume an American-style scientific commitment to logical positivism, Americans view the European tradition as making at most an ambiguous commitment to any defined epistemology. European sociology is seen by Americans as placing a less central role for the scientific model, downplaying testing for descriptions, prediction for explanation, axiomatic propositions for rhetorical questions, and linear causality for historical or dialectical reasoning. For example, the European argument that compared with American approaches, European approaches "are less obsessed with measures and quantitative data, and more interpretive" is consistent with the image of European social science as being less uncritically accepting of logical positivism and scientism than Americans.

These preferences can be seen in the Europeans' use of the works of Max Weber in different ways than the Americans. European scholars tend to accept Weber's ideas about the difficulty of determining causality and therefore emphasize descriptive history. European scholars tend to accept Weber's ideas about the problem of meaning in social action and therefore emphasize phenomenology rather than social structure. European scholars tend to accept Weber's ideas about the problematic nature of objectivity and therefore emphasize subjectivity. So while Weber, the paramount tightrope-walker, maintains that the cup of an objective social science is both half empty and half full, Americans take off on their journeys never fearing that they will run out of water, while Europeans stand in their backyard digging ever deeper.

At the same time, the Europeans claim that their ambiguity toward logical positivism and scientism is balanced with more epistemological awareness and sophistication than is typical of many Americans. As one scholar maintained:

> We tend to question the institutionalized frames of knowledge... more interest in the epistemological debates involving social and natural sciences (crisis of certainty, objectivity, truth, etc.)...

Here the notion is not that European social scientists are committed to a different epistemology, but rather that they are more sensitive than American social scientists to debates over the underlying epistemology of how to do social science.

EUROPEAN PARTICULARISM VERSUS AMERICAN UNIVERSALISM

Finally, our discussions indicate that it would appear that Europeans view themselves as having a different interpretation of their empirical referents than do Americans. While the above quotes give an image of an epistemology that is relatively fluid, the empirical referents of the discipline appear to be approached with a great concern for detail, with an emphasis on the complexity of the problem and the uniqueness of the empirical referent. For example, one scholar argued strongly that European approaches seem to be more concerned with particular national contexts and chauvinistic searches for distinctively national ways of organizing.[1]

This concern for distinctive details in the empirical referent shows that although Europeans examine organizations from a more macro perspective, this macro perspective appears to have multiple dimensions to it. For example, while many Americans tend to view organizations monolithically, there has always been a sense that Europeans consider organizations as pluralistic entities. As a result, Europeans, based on the tradition of Weber and Crozier, emphasize organizations as fragile entities based on some form of negotiations.

SPECULATION ON THE SOURCE OF THESE DIFFERENCES

Before we begin our analysis of these chapters in terms of these four dimensions of "European-ness," we ask the reader's forgiveness for indulging in the pleasure of speculating as to why these differences emerge. The American concern with universal principles, or what has been labeled the nomothetic, and the European concern with what has been labeled the idiosyncratic or the ideographic, might be grounded in two distinctly different societal orientations.

American social science seems to be based on the possibly naive assumption that if we strike deeply enough, we will find universal principles that are applicable to any circumstance and any situation. Even in their ethnography, Americans talk about grounded theory.[2] Americans try to squeeze the specific into the general, achieving universality by applying formal principles across boundaries.

In contrast, scholars in the European tradition tend to be much more concerned with their distinctive identity. Because Europeans interact in a much smaller space, they have greater cross-national contact. They are therefore more

apt to recognize "the other," and more interested in defining themselves in relation to that other. A German social scientist who recognizes a French social scientist reinforces the unique aspects of what is German about his or her work and what is French about the other's work. One perceives and accepts the other, and in fact defines oneself in relation to that other.

Fundamentally, this represents a dismissal of the possibility of universality. Indeed, historically, this contact, combined with Europeans' concern for their nation-states, has led to the non-universality of European social science—the concern with uniqueness and detail. So while Europeans may seem obsessed with the particular and the unique, Americans may seem obsessed with finding and proving universal principles.

A METAPHOR FOR THE RELATIONSHIP: THE BIRTHRIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY

At the end of our preliminary inquiries, we were looking for a metaphor which could vividly express the state of our understanding of the issue, or our working hypothesis at that stage of our reflection. We thought that Europeans might be seen as viewing themselves as collectively representing the biblical character Jacob to the American Esau, and that Americans might be seen as viewing themselves as collectively representing Esau. Jacob and Esau were born of the same father. One became a thinker, a philosopher, an idealist. The other became a hunter, a gatherer, a materialist. Their lives became a struggle for their birthright. European and American sociology were born of the same tradition. One has been cast as historical, philosophical, and non-empirical, while the other has been viewed as ahistorical, axiomatic, and empirical. Sharing the same tradition, the struggle between European and American sociology has been over who best represents the legacy of the founding fathers of social theory.

Now that you have read the chapters and interpreted them in terms of your own preconceptions, it is appropriate for us to present our analysis of the extent to which they conform to the images of European scholarship in organization studies that we found in our short preliminary inquiry. That is, now that we have identified our "working hypothesis" of what the European tradition in organization studies is all about, we can proceed to the second task in this project. That is, we can now analyze our nine chapters, looking for common themes, traits, stances, or methodologies, seeking validation or refutal of the four general dimensions of European organizational studies outlined above, and making some general comments about how the authors interpreted our commission to represent a European viewpoint. We proceed in the order in which the chapters appear in the volume.

Of Values and Occasional Irony: Max Weber in the Context of the Sociology of Organizations

It seemed natural to begin the volume with Clegg's chapter because it is based on an implicit assumption that to understand the European tradition in a field of study, one must trace historical connections between current lines of thought and the work of the founding fathers in that field. In organization studies, many if not most would agree that the most important founding father is Max Weber. Clegg's implicit hypothesis is that if there is a valid distinction between the European tradition and other traditions in organizational studies, then it would show up in different ways that Weber's thought has been developed and is currently being used.

This hypothesis is consistent with our speculation earlier that Americans would be more concerned with Weber's rationalist rather than his cultural side, and that Americans would be more concerned with the structural notion of bureaucracy, while Europeans would pay more attention to the notion of meaning in social action. Behind all of this is our assumption that Americans would adopt a formalistic, structural, axiomatic approach to Weber, while the Europeans would take the opposite position.

On one level, Clegg's answer to the question of the existence of continental differences is clearly in the negative. He points out that Weber's legacy has been betrayed by the majority of *both* European and American organizational scholars. In making his case, Clegg argues that Weber's work was much broader and deeper than his portrayal of bureaucracy as an ideal type, and characterized by a common emphasis on the cultural values that underlie historical phenomena—values that were said to be squeezed out by the iron cage of bureaucracy.

> [Although Weber] had sought to provide a critique of scientific reason applied to cultural phenomena and had always stressed the saturation of these phenomena in meaning and value, organization theory had "normalized" his thought sufficiently that it became seen as a flawed example of precisely what it opposed (i.e., meaninglessness, valuelessness, efficiency-driven behavior (Clegg this volume).

Clegg documents this irony by arguing that ever since the work of Pugh and Hickson and Richard Hall, and even going back to Merton, scholars on *both* sides of the Atlantic have been disproportionately concerned with Weber's model of bureaucracy, making misguided efforts to study the efficiency or inefficiency of such structures. Clegg claims that scholars on *both* sides of the Atlantic have for the most part dismissed the main body of the Weberian perspective—the role of meaningful action and culture.

Why did this happen? Clegg suggests that the ideal type of bureaucracy was diffused so widely because it resonated with (had "an elective affinity with"

in his terms) the deep-rooted Western assumption (e.g., from Marx and Durkheim) that the forces of modernity (and bureaucracies were seen as the essence of modernity) would steadily erode all cultural differences. Indeed, this assumption is at the heart of what we discussed earlier as the American predilection for universalism, and entirely consistent with our prediction that Americans would pick the "rationalist" and "objectivist" side of Weber's work.

That is very plausible, but there is another historical explanation. Given that the Weberian model of bureaucracy was primarily diffused and translated outside of Germany after the Second World War, it is also reasonable to speculate that one reason why the "American" side of Weber dominated on both sides of the Atlantic was the American economic and cultural hegemony at that time. Indeed, the history of organization theory paralleled industrial development, and despite the initial French and British contributions, the American surge of organization studies near the Second World War coincides with the establishment of the primacy of the U.S. economy. It may be that the "American" side of Weber dominated only because the Americans dominated postwar organization studies.

On the other hand, Clegg also points out that not all organizational scholars ignored Weber's cultural studies. From the perspective of our volume, the most interesting thing is not that the cultural side of Weber's work lives on in the work of a few, but that the examples that Clegg cites are from several countries on both sides of the Atlantic. The widespread misinterpretation of Weber's legacy on both sides of the Atlantic, and the presence of the few counter-examples of this also on both sides of the Atlantic combine to make it appear that the European tradition is no more concerned with Weber as a founding father than the Americans. So with respect to Weber, the hypothesis of intercontinental differences is apparently refuted. Thus, at an empirical level, Clegg's chapter tends to refute the connection between organizational ideas and geographic origin.

However, there is much more to Clegg's chapter than his conclusion. Interestingly, Clegg's chapter has many characteristics associated with the four dimensions of what we identified as stereotypically European. One clue is provided by the fact that such a rich analysis of Weber's multi-disciplinary and eclectic work could only be done effectively by a scholar such as Clegg who is able to cite literature from many different disciplines.

A second clue is in the fact that Clegg seeks throughout the manuscript to put Weber in as broad a societal context as possible, discussing economic, political, cultural, and intellectual roots and effects of scholarly developments in the Weberian tradition. This is consistent with the view of European scholarship uncovered in our initial interviews.

A third clue is in the fact that Clegg's chapter seems to be a polemic against the tendency in our field to squeeze Weber's broader works into a narrow positivist and quantitative epistemology. Although Clegg is arguing that this

distortion is universal, we earlier identified it as American, so one interpretation of Clegg's chapter is as a polemic against Europeans who adopted the "American" interpretation and selective use of Weber's work. In a sense, Clegg can be seen as favoring a more ambiguous and sophisticated "European" epistemology.

The fourth and final clue is that Clegg is arguing that for a post-industrial society, the most relevant part of the Weberian tradition is his recommended method of studying organizations—the analysis of cultural foundations. At its heart this is a rejection of "American" universalism (e.g., the iron law of bureaucracy) and an advocacy of more nationally-rooted European particularism.

The correspondence of the content of Clegg's chapter to the four dimensions of what we hypothesized to be the European tradition is striking. Although Clegg may have intentionally and successfully provided evidence refuting the existence of a peculiar European tradition with regards to the most prominent European in our field, Max Weber, both the substantial evidence that he provides and the style of his argument reveal the traits of our "ideal-typical" European scholar! This is a bit ironic when you read in his biographical statement that he apparently found employment and some satisfaction as a scholar in neither Europe nor North America, but in Australia.

Models of Pluralistic Organization: The Contribution of European Decision Making Research

Grandori has offered us a selective review of European studies in the area of organizational decision making. She describes European attempts to build on Simon's work on bounded rationality by integrating descriptive and prescriptive decision-making models and developing anarchic, polyarchic, and democratic decision process models. Her topic provides a good contrast with Clegg's chapter, because Grandori is describing European development in this area as having been constructed on a foundation built by Simon, one of the founding fathers of organizational studies in North America.

However, Grandori approaches the problem differently from Clegg. Instead of tracing the lines of influence of a founding father, she focuses on the ways that European values have influenced the development of European theories of decision making in organization. She describes the relevant European values as a diffidence toward determinism (and thus the possibility for effective action), a concern with the freedom of actors, and an acknowledgement of the healthy role of power, interest, and conflict processes in organizations.

She then builds a case that these values are manifest in various European theories of decision making, which she describes as sharing the following characteristics: "Organized systems tend to be considered as *pluralistic systems* of cooperation and competition among interdependent actors who are the

legitimate holders of different interests... In European studies, the organization is taken as problematic and in need of justification rather than the particularistic interests." One can clearly see how these theories derive from the European values that Grandori describes. The preference for individual freedom over structural determinism makes interest-group competition fruitful, and leads to the European change in focus from the macro to the meso level.

Grandori also describes American approaches in order to more clearly highlight the European perspective. She claims that Americans tend to see the firm as an arena where social actors accumulate resources as means to accumulating power, see a struggle between power and efficiency as rival motives for action, and express a distaste for power and admiration for efficiency. In contrast, Europeans do not consider power as an objective or independent variable, do not consider resources as a good indicator of power, and are not interested in manipulative behavior, even if it can increase an actor's power. Rather, Europeans suggest that power is only a means of exchange (a currency) in the normal and healthy process of organizational politics and governance.

This contrasts with the viewpoint expressed by Clegg, who describes both Americans and Europeans as focusing on bureaucratic efficiency and ignoring the power motives underlying bureaucratic decisions. According to Grandori, neither Europeans nor Americans ignore power issues, but they treat them differently. Americans view power struggles as an inevitable evil dragging down efficiency, and Europeans view them as a functional means of coordinating diverse interests and governing complex organizations.

The overall image that emerges from Grandori's chapter is that a European perspective to decision making in organizations differs from an American perspective by placing greater emphasis on the subjective and pluralistic. In other words, instead of the American emphasis on the structurally monolithic nature of organizations, Europeans follow Weber and Crozier and focus on the fragility of organizations that are based on negotiations.

Whether this is the case or not is open to debate. However, in Grandori's chapter, she clearly assumes and accentuates this distinction. This notion of power as a negotiated phenomenon subjectively existing in organizations is clearly consistent with the larger analysis of Weber offered by Clegg. The irony of course is that Grandori, in her chapter, does not cite the work of Weber. Perhaps this is evidence supporting Grandori's overall contention that the European tradition seeps into their work through their common values. If this is true, then Europeans do not always need to cite specific works of the masters because the ideas of the masters are reflected in the European "collective unconscious" and values.

Overall, Grandori provides us with a fairly explicit set of answers to the questions raised in this project. First, yes, there is such a thing as "the European tradition," because Europeans do construct theory differently. Second, Europeans have constructed theories of decision making with common characteristics due to their shared European values. Third, it therefore follows that knowledge is bounded by one's cultural orientation. In effect, she was asked to represent the European tradition, and has done so by providing an example of an area where Europeans have contributed, contrasting the European contributions with the American theories in the same general area, and explaining the values that went into making those contributions European.

Grandori's chapter also displays many of the features that we identified as characteristic of Europeans, whether or not that was her intention. A look at the citations shows her liberal use of ideas from many disciplines such as political science, philosophy, and social policy, as well as traditional disciplines associated with organizational studies. She discusses the models of decision making in organization using the language of political science from the broader societal context. She is very aware of the interconnections between conceptual issues and methodological concerns like the unit of analysis. Finally, the thrust of her argument is particularist rather than universal; she explains that European pluralist models are practical because of Pareto's point that differences in actors' interests make cooperation fruitful for all.

Organizations and Collective Action: Our Contribution to Organizational Analysis

In their chapter for this volume, Crozier and Friedberg clearly dismiss the traditional opposition between American and European sociology, instead focusing on the conscious and unconscious exchange of ideas across the Atlantic, and the role of labels and images in determining the way a particular intellectual product is received and interpreted. In fact, their own work is a good example of that exchange. Although both are European, they describe their method as being rooted in the American qualitative research methods of the 1950s. Substantively, they combine the relational concept of power from one group of American political scientists (e.g., Dahl and Emerson) and the concept of bounded rationality from another American political scientist, Herbert Simon, into an exploration of the sociological boundaries of management rationality.

Interestingly for this project, Crozier and Friedberg lament the fact that at first, their early works were criticized in Europe as being "too American" but were praised in America as an example of European assertiveness, and later, the pattern was reversed as Americans became more ideological and the Europeans less so. The fact that their theory was received differently in different cultural contexts (both geographic and temporal) is consistent with their methodological advice to researchers who would use their framework.

Despite the American features of their model and its initially cool reception in Europe, Crozier and Friedberg have obviously had a major impact on the development of European sociological theory and organization studies. Not surprisingly, Crozier and Friedberg's work receives prominence in both the Grandori and Clegg chapters in this volume. Grandori discusses their work's central importance to European theories of decision making that are constructed around the concept of the well-defined and self-interested social actor. Clegg cites their work as being a good example of the continuation of the Weberian tradition of theory (meaningful social action), and epistemology.[3]

In our earlier discussion, we talked about Europeans and Americans having different epistemologies, with the Americans seeing causality and generalizeability as less problematic than the Europeans. In their chapter, Crozier and Friedberg maintain that while their analytical perspective is generalizable, it must be considered always in the specific locale or historical situation. That is, although the formal aspects of their theoretical orientation (e.g., the relationships between constructs at the propositional level) are transferable from culture to culture, the specific content of the theory (e.g., the specific definition of variables) must vary by context.[4] In that sense, they manifest some of the formalism that we find in American research, but do not attach that formalism to the generalizability of logical positivism.

Crozier and Friedberg stand in an ambiguous position with respect to the four dimensions of the stereotypically European tradition that we have identified above. They are certainly multi-disciplinary, with citations and arguments derived from philosophy and political science as well as the traditional disciplines associated with organizational studies. Although they insist that their theoretical framework be used with sensitivity to the cultural context, the "action" in their theory of "action" really takes place not at the societal level but at the group and individual levels. We have already noted their unique combination of analytical rigor and apparently ambiguous commitment to logical positivism. Finally, it seems like they are trying to have the cake of a universalist theoretical framework while eating it by warning their readers of the importance of cultural particulars.

All in all, it seems that Crozier and Friedberg accepted the assignment to be self-reflective of their own contributions to organizational studies without any attempt to demonstrate that their roots are in any European tradition of social science. They seem quite aware that their contribution is original, and probably take for granted that it is based on European tradition and European values, even if their Weberian roots and their underlying values are more clearly pointed out by Clegg and Grandori. Their self-reflections in this volume will no doubt provide useful material to scholars who will likely be poring over the meaning of their important work in the future.

Discovering the Japanese Model: Cognitive Processes in European and American Sociology

In a sense, Bonazzi focuses on the same processes that Crozier and Friedberg explore in their chapter[5]—the processes by which theories are interpreted in different cultural contexts. This emphasis on the contextual nature of culture is a follow-up on some of the themes developed by Crozier in his book about France (Crozier 1964), and Lammers and Hickson (1979) in their effort to look at the impact of European contexts on organizational adaptation processes.

On one level, Bonazzi's chapter can be read as a detailed history of the development and diffusion of Japanese models of organization. However, the most interesting way to deal with it is on the level of the sociology of knowledge. Bonazzi is providing support for the premise that in order to understand the adoption of ideas, we have to understand both the sources from which they are generated and the places where they are being adopted. Here the notion of a specific culture tied to specific national economies, political ideologies, and social philosophies becomes important. Bonazzi's chapter serves to reinforce the image of European organizational theory as dealing with the organizational context in broad terms rather than as a series of specific variables.

Bonazzi claims that sociologists of organizations interpret the Japanese perspective based on the characteristics of the culture in which they are embedded. For example, he discusses the varied interpretations of the Japanese model as being rooted in historic differences in the attitudes of the scholarly community toward labor unions in various European countries and the United States. He also claims that despite its alien nature, the literature on the Japanese model lies within the mainstream of existing research programs in the West, indicating that the scientific community is attempting to understand it within its own existing categories of knowledge.

By discussing the reception of an Eastern theory in various Western cultural contexts, Bonazzi is dealing explicitly with the themes of this volume. For Bonazzi, being a European or an American scholar means to use particular cognitive processes, or to use particular lenses in looking at the same phenomenon (the Japanese model). He describes extremely carefully how particular traditions, ideologies, and values affect the perception, the evaluation, and the interpretation of organizational realities, and what these traditions, ideologies, and values are for Europeans and Americans. In a sense, he arrives at the core-value (attitude toward slack in resources) by gradually digging through other more superficial layers of cultural orientations.

In terms of empirical referent, Bonazzi's chapter is more focused on themes of industrial relations and organizational theory than the other chapters in this volume. He uses these bodies of literature as data, sifting through them to illustrate his main point that in order to move from the theoretical level to

the practical level, one must cast aside any illusions that there can be universal, generic applications of theories, and attempt to interpret such nomothetic theories according to the idiosyncratic features of local cultures. In a sense, his chapter is a good example of what we found to be a European preference for the particularist over the universalist perspective.

By discussing the process through which ideas emigrate and are adopted, Bonazzi is introducing a theme which will be more fully developed in the three chapters after Ebers'. That is, by introducing the particular problem of how ideas about industrial relations become materialized and routinized into process technology in other cultural contexts, Bonazzi is introducing the more general problem of the subtle and dynamic relationship between ideas and action, and the travel of ideas across action contexts.

Although Bonazzi's chapter manifests only some of the tendencies that we identified as European (the tendency to put organizations in societal context, and the preference for particularism), his chapter provides some very concrete examples of the ways that different European national and cultural contexts affect the way that a specific theoretical model is adapted. By focusing on the diversity within Europe as well as the diversity between Europe and North America, Bonazzi seems to be downplaying geographical distance and emphasizing the impact of cultural values and traditions. This can be interpreted as implying that the much talked about global village is leading to the proliferation of many different interpretations of a few well-travelled models (the particularist viewpoint), rather than to a convergence of cultures (the universalist viewpoint).

The Framing of Organizational Cultures

One thread of common content running through the first four chapters is the importance of cultural values: Clegg emphasizes the neglect of Weber's cultural studies, Grandori explains the way that European theories of decision making in organizations are rooted in common cultural values, Crozier and Friedberg stress both the cultural determinants of the reaction on both sides of the Atlantic to their work and the necessity for good researchers to "customize" universalist theoretical frameworks to particular cultural environments, and Bonazzi stresses the way that sociologists and managers have used various cultural "lenses" to interpret and apply the Japanese model of industrial relations in the West. These have all been consistent with the stereotypical European tendency to put organizations in the context of broader societies.

Ebers takes a different approach, focusing on cultures within organizations. He starts by applying a very deductive and functionalist thought process, asking what organizational cultures need in order to be effective over long time periods. Based on these organizational needs, Ebers then constructs a theoretical typology of organizational cultures, and then proceeds to justify it by explaining how it could be useful to integrate hitherto scattered and only partially overlapping models of organizational culture. He closes with a set of testable propositions for researchers to use to verify the applicability of his typology. In effect, Ebers offers us a framework in order to understand the mechanisms operating to create contextual effects. In that sense, the Ebers chapter does for culture what Crozier and Friedberg's work did for action. Crozier and Friedberg gave us a framework to analyze action in specific contexts; Ebers gives us a framework to analyze culture in specific contexts.

In terms of its subject matter, Ebers' chapter fits well with the other chapters of this volume. His two dimensions of validity of organizational cultures correspond to themes developed and discussed elsewhere. Indeed, the tension between ideational content and action consequences is explicit in most of the other chapters, and implicit in the rest. The tension between external compatibility and internal consent is less explicit, but still appears in a number of chapters, including Bonazzi, Czarniawska and Joerges, and Brunsson.

Overall, however, this chapter provides clear evidence refuting our main hypothesis about the characteristics of European scholarship in organization studies. In fact, this chapter is the only one in this volume that does not seem to fit any of the dimensions that we identified as stereotypically European. Compared to the other chapters in this volume, it is not very multi-disciplinary: a look at the citations shows that it is primarily focused on themes of organizational culture (or what the Europeans call organizational symbolism). Except for the discussion of the necessity for organizational cultures to legitimize their ideas in the broader society, it is not focused very heavily on broader societal themes. There is nothing very ambiguous about its positivist epistemology; in fact, it can be lauded for its rigor, clearly spelled out theoretical assumptions, and for the author's attempt to present his ideas in a falsifiable format. Finally, Ebers attempts to put many particularist and diverse theories of organizational culture in a universalist format by squeezing the content out of them and making them more abstract.

Is the author's nationality then the only feature which makes this chapter European? There are some other indications. Ebers chooses a theoretical territory that is extremely fragmented—the organizational culture literature—where a comprehensive theoretical model is much needed, and tries to show us what it means to build a model "in the European tradition." He uses the concept of "ideal-type" (again, the ghost of Weber!) and he tries to combine an inductive with a deductive approach and tries to combine a structuralist (constraints) with an interactionist (free-choice) approach. Is Ebers implicitly saying that because Americans have not tried or not succeeded with this combination of approaches, a European is more likely to? We leave it to the reader to decide.

Winds of Organizational Change: How Ideas Translate into Objects and Actions

Up to this point, the chapters have dealt for the most part with the cultural context of ideas, and the cultural context of action. Clegg and Grandori primarily dealt with the former, Crozier and Friedberg and Bonazzi dealt with both, and Ebers dealt with the latter. It falls to Czarniawska and Joerges, Brunsson, and Cooper and Law to specify the reciprocal processes by which ideas in specific contexts are transformed into actions, and actions are transformed into ideas. Czarniawska and Joerges start by illustrating the cyclical process by which ideas travel. In this process, they claim that culture operates as a medium through which ideas are translated into action locally and then translated back into ideas which travel across time and space to be in turn institutionalized globally.

In many ways, this chapter fits the stereotypes identified with the European approach. The authors are extremely multi-disciplinary and eclectic. A look at their reference list shows that it includes works in many disciplines, not only from areas associated with organization studies (e.g., sociology, psychology, and management science), but also from anthropology, political science, philosophy, the sociology of knowledge, fashion and design, and a number of works in other languages.

Czarniawska and Joerges also use ideas from diverse disciplines to put organizations in a broader social, political, ideological, and cultural context. They are definitely at the level of "grand theory" rather than "middle range theory." In fact, some scholars of organization studies might feel that they take this to extreme; in their chapter they pay little or no attention to organizational boundaries in their discussion of the processes by which "the winds of change" sweep ideas to and from local and global space-time contexts.

In addition, these authors are quite sophisticated about epistemological issues, and, also consistent with our image of European scholars, tend to favor description over model testing, explanation over prediction, rhetorical questions over axiomatic propositions, and historical or dialectical reasoning over linear causality. In contrast, they manifest no commitment at all to the canons of logical positivism; for example, there is no attention paid to how their ideas could or should be tested or falsified by future researchers.

On the other hand, Czarniawska and Joerges' chapter does not manifest the expected European commitment to particularism over universalism. In fact, one could argue the reverse. Although they ground their ideas with vivid and detailed examples, the whole thrust of their chapter seems aimed at developing a grand theory of the universal process by which ideas travel throughout the world and are adopted in many particular and presumably diverse contexts because "their time has come." However, this may be due to their level of analysis rather than their particular style as Europeans. If they had used more

time and space focusing on the details of a few examples of their theory in one empirical referent, then it seems likely that their chapter would have turned out to be more particular than universal. These are the inherent tradeoffs with a short chapter at the grand theoretical level.

Overall, it is the editors' opinion that in responding to our invitation, Czarniawska and Joerges display the qualities that they consider to be European. What they display is their interest in a processual, historical, dynamic, and dialectical view of social and organizational realities. These interests are especially evident in the stylistic qualities of the chapter. For example, their choice of words and their use of flowing language are consistent; "wind" is used in the title, and the process is described as "travelling ideas." Their subtitles appear in succession like a series of images in a film. Czarniawska and Joerges reveal their identity through the style as well as the content of their chapter.

Ideas and Actions: Justification and Hypocrisy as Alternatives to Control

After Czarniawska and Joerges' exploration of the processes by which ideas "blow through" organizational boundaries according to dynamic and cyclical but hard-to-pin-down fashion-like processes, Brunsson explores how people in real organizations reconcile the fickle nature of ideas with the "institutionalized" status of organizations that need to maintain both their historic and cultural identities and predictable behavioral institutions. With a delicate sense of irony and a non-judgmental tone, Brunsson explores various possible resolutions of the contradiction between ideas and action in organizations.

Although cast firmly at the organizational rather than the global level, Brunsson's chapter confirms many of the hypothesized dimensions of European identity. Some of his references (e.g., Aristotle, Edwards, Mandeville, Ross, and Siegel) reveal the breadth of his scholarship. His exploration of the mismatch between societal values and organizational needs or policies in political decision making and public administration puts organizations in societal context. Like Czarniawska and Joerges, Brunsson is quite sophisticated about epistemological issues. Like his "ideal-typical" European colleagues, Brunsson favors description over model testing, explanation over prediction, rhetorical questions over axiomatic propositions, and historical or dialectical reasoning over linear causality, and demonstrates no commitment at all to falsifiability, testability, or the other dictates of logical positivism.

Finally, recall that we speculated that Czarniawska and Joerges would have shown a more particularist perspective had they focused on one empirical referent. Brunsson is a good test of this hypothesis, as he is dealing with the same general ideas as his colleagues, but within one empirical referent—public

administration. At first glance, one tends to think that Brunsson is more of a universalist. He discusses what he claims are universal tensions that arise between idea-generating and idea-implementation processes in organizations.

On the other hand, Brunsson is making the broader point that imperfect and irrational humans, who all have their own political interests at stake, will be unable to adapt slow-changing organizations to fast-changing ideas, and therefore the particular (and very political) details of the organizational reality will force humans to make cognitive adjustments (hypocrisy or justification) to reconcile the contradiction in favor of the organizational reality. So in the end, Brunsson is suggesting that because ideas cannot be implemented fast enough, the particular organizational realities usually over-ride the universal ideas that blow around society.

In terms of style, Brunsson's chapter seems to go overboard in his conformity to stereotype—it is not only stereotypically European, but even stereotypically Scandinavian. He is realistic, skeptical, mercilessly lucid in demolishing the myth of organizational rationality, in the cynical tradition of European political science that goes back to Machiavelli. This chapter also exhibits him as one of the most brilliant representatives of the Scandinavian school of thought that brought us studies of the "erosion of rationality" and the "garbage-can" model of organizational decision making. He obviously takes great pleasure in undermining the idea of "control" that is central but undiscussed in much of American organizational theory. Fortunately, Brunsson's gentle sense of humor takes the sting out of his provocative and scandalous message.

Organization: Distal and Proximal Views

The proximal philosophy presented in Cooper and Law is an explicit treatment of an epistemology that underlies most of the chapters in this volume. Their emphasis on the proximal clearly reinforces the tradition of examining process, context, and ambiguity. Their emphasis on organizations as sets of object-components and their idea-relationships is consistent with many of the previous chapters. For example, it is consistent with Grandori and Crozier and Friedberg, who see organizations as constantly being renegotiated by actors with varying power resources. It is also consistent with the contextual emphasis that Bonazzi and Ebers put on the application of ideas. It is most consistent with both the translation processes found in the Czarniawska and Joerges chapter and the problem of how actors go about resolving the dilemmas of action and ideas identified in the Brunsson chapter.

In Cooper and Law's chapter, we can find many of the attitudes that our preliminary survey identified as being stereotypically European. A look at their reference list shows that these authors seem to intend to come across to the reader as intellectuals and philosophers rather than organizational scholars. There are only a few references to works in organizational studies, and these

tend to be classics such as Lawrence and Lorsch. At the same time, there are many eclectic citations to European philosophers whose work few American scholars are likely to have read, much less integrated into their thinking about organizations.

Their examples are not only of processes and relationships that occur within organizations, but of the relationships between such processes and the social and technological context. The ability of the Portuguese to sail to India depended not only on organizational but also on technological innovation. The ability of Rose and her manager to continue their research work depends upon the ability of outsiders in other laboratories to replicate their work, just as Pasteur's laboratory success was dependent upon his successes in the field. Cooper and Law seem to share Czarniawska and Joerges' disdain for strong organizational boundaries.

As implied above, Cooper and Law's proximal epistemology is very different from logical positivism, even if well-rooted in the ideas of "becoming" and "praxis" in Hegel and Marx (which they do not cite—is this a second case of a European not feeling it necessary to cite something that must be "taken for granted" by every European scholar?). Unlike most Europeans who are ambiguous or express ambivalence toward the dominant American epistemology, Cooper and Law start out their chapter with a heavyhanded critique of the one-sidedness of the traditional model of science that characterizes typical sociological approaches to organizational study. They seem to delight in violating what Americans take for granted by mixing the oil of laboratory rats and the water of calculators together to form representations of other realities that are composed of even more heterogenous elements.

Cooper and Law are also straddling the fence between the universalist and particularist perspectives. They imply that it is the application of new advances in universalist ideas that forms technological advances that permit new combinations of heterogenous materials to be assembled in new and innovative ways in local particular contexts, to be then re-exported to other contexts. In that sense, they seem to blend elements from the Bonazzi and Czarniawska and Joerges chapters. At the same time, Cooper and Law's concern for the particular is evident both in their use of the concepts of miniaturization and representation, and in their point about the importance of getting the details right for the successful replication of results.

To the editors, the most remarkable thing about the Cooper and Law chapter is the way in which it seems to push the stereotypical European attitudes to the furthest extreme possible. They seem to be showcasing their European identity by their philosophical eclecticism, their attack on status-quo epistemologies, and their unusually dense style. They seem to know that Americans often find the Europeans difficult to understand through steady and simple categories, so they seem to revel in trying to be even more

"irreducible" than usual. Interestingly, their chapter was the one about which there was the strongest divergence of opinion between the European and American editors, with the dialogue between the American editors and the authors demonstrating some of the dynamics of "non-reducibility." Because of that divergence of opinion and due to the extremity of its positions, the Cooper and Law chapter may be one of the clearest examples of the stereotype of the European scholar that we are trying to flush out in this volume.

A Personal Trajectory through Organization Studies

In their chapter, Cooper and Law illustrate the heuristic power of a proximal view of organization by contrasting different views of Andrew, the manager of a scientific laboratory. Seen distally, Andrew is merely a series of attributes. Seen proximally, Andrew becomes the somewhat stable outcome of a relational and intentional pattern of heterogeneous materials, and a center of translation. Similarly, if we try to specify what makes a European organizational scholar in terms of attributes, we can look at him or her in a distal mode. Most of the chapters in this book can be considered as distal "snapshots" revealing the attributes present in the minds of their authors. However, the Turner chapter can be considered as a proximal "videotape" revealing the pattern of heterogeneous materials that went into his socialization as a scholar, and the translation processes that resulted in his past work and current attributes.

Substantively and stylisticly, if we view the first eight chapters in succession, there is a sort of "crescendo" along two dimensions. The first dimension is from the conventional-traditional-orthodox to the unconventional-provocative-unorthodox. The second dimension is from explicit-analytical answers to our questions (discussions of the European distinctiveness in doing organizational research) to implicit-stylistic-aesthetic answers to the questions that manifest themselves in the substance and style of the chapters. Turner's chapter is therefore appropriately put at the end of the volume, at the intersection of these two crescendos. His auto-biographical statement represents the triumph of subjectivity without concern for orthodoxy, and the illustration of European scholarship through the unique and particular history of one organizational scholar.

Turner's chapter confirms most of the traits of the stereotypes of European scholars that we identified earlier. In particular, we would like to point out that not only Turner's reference list, but his life—as he described it in this chapter—was eclectic and multidisciplinary in the best sense of the words. Although he specialized enough to make an international reputation for his work in several areas of inquiry, Turner embodied two traditions: the spirit of the old-fashioned European intellectual, and the old-fashioned European belief that because places are culture-bearing milieu, one must go on a "grand tour" to experience them personally.

It is also interesting to note that despite his initial exposure to the quantitative world of the Aston Group, Turner was not afraid to use subjective and experiential data in non-falsifiable ways. In his case, his technique of self-reflection involved delving much deeper than mere self-awareness demanded. While self-awareness requires the researcher to examine his or her own reactions to external phenomena, the self-reflection requires the researcher to examine his or her reactions to internal and external phenomenon in a much deeper way.

Turner's chapter shows very clearly the extent to which ideas are intertwined with personal life experiences, physical settings, and social interactions. First of all, ideas are made, so to speak, of flesh and blood, and we do not simply accept them because they seem to be reasonable, but also because we feel *sympathetic* to them. Turner discusses this explicitly:

> ...my own understanding, then, made me sympathetic to situational accounts of the world... I have always been sympathetic to unplanned approaches of the kind offered by the social phenomenology of Schutz and Berger and Luckmann... allowing me to make sense of the diverse range of my organizational experiences in industry (Turner this volume, pp. 281, 283).

Second, ideas are connected to places and persons, as shown by the flow of visitors to Exhibition Road to communicate with Woodward and her team. Indeed, physical settings shape persons and ideas, as exemplified by Turner's description of the transformation of the British participants during EGOS colloquia (p. 291). Finally, social relations are the bed of ideas, as demonstrated by the positive effect that the symbolic social events had at the SCOS conferences (pp. 293-294).

One element of Turner's chapter that did not emerge as clearly from the other chapters is the emotional relevance of the topic that we selected. This comes out between the lines throughout the chapter, including the account of Parson's visit to Birmingham, Lazarsfeld's advice to "pay attention to the work of this Britisher," the importance of Woodward's invitation by Lawrence and Lorsch, the description of Follett as a "quintessentially American individual," the description of European values of variety, tolerance, and play, as opposed to the technical/professional values in the United States, and the general postwar awareness that Europeans were playing catch-up in a game where the Americans had the edge. In general, these examples show that during Turner's scholarly life, the distinction between European and American scholars had much more symbolic and emotional than analytical relevance. Although this emotional dimension is not dealt with in the journals, the question of the "we" and "they" seems to be a real underlying concern—probably for most Europeans and only for some Americans—creating ambivalence and affecting the way that we relate to each other.

Turner's chapter is the story of the socialization process of one European scholar. Obviously it is difficult to know to what extent he is idiosyncratic or fits a pattern; even if Turner's socialization can fairly be described as "typically European," then we have only limited and indirect evidence that the American pattern is similar or different. Despite these limitations, we can allow ourselves to speculate based on the "distal" view of all of our contributors and the "proximal" self-reflection of Turner. Some of the traits that we identified as stereotypically "European" (e.g., minds non-axiomatic, critical, and open to subversive discoveries) seem to be the outcome of the distinctive structural features of the European field of study, described as less regulated and less institutionalized than the American one, permitting and even encouraging a wide-ranging intellectual curiosity.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS IN THE TOPIC

In this volume, we have begun our investigation by examining a subset of those scholars who we think are the descendants of Jacob's side of the sociological family tree—that is, the European sociologists of organizations. We have now completed and shared our analysis of the nine chapters in terms of the stereotypical attributes of European scholars of organization studies.

The pattern which comes out from these chapters by and large confirms the pre-conceptions, held by both Americans and Europeans in our field, about what it means to have or to adopt a European research style in organization studies. Note that the findings of our small inquiry do not allow us to say that these characteristics are endemic to or exclusive of European scholars. There are certainly Europeans who do research differently, just as there are Americans who share the epistemological positions, the thematic choices, and even the cultural value orientations displayed by the authors involved in this project.

What we can say is that those Europeans who adopt this pattern, when they do so, are likely to be convinced that they adopt a research style that is distinctively European. Correspondingly, we can presume that those Americans who inspire their work on the basis of those principles are likely to be convinced that they are moving in a "European" intellectual tradition and to feel themselves closer to their European colleagues.

It is also probable that the conceptions that have emerged in our inquiry affect the norms of legitimacy that rule the European scientific community. For instance, this may be reflected in terms of criteria used to evaluate chapters submitted to scientific journals of the field (e.g., see Cummings and Frost, *Publishing in the Organizational Sciences*). Perhaps, some of these chapters, at least in this form, would not have been accepted in many American journals, whose editorial policy seems to be still strongly inspired by logical positivism.[5]

Indeed, one thing that most Americans seem to share, whether they are ethnographers or experimentalists, is the belief in science: they bring to their endeavors more faith, be it in a false God or not, while the Europeans bring to their endeavor the cynicism and reality of complexity.

In the light of this last observation, we wonder if—at the end of this reflection—we can still consider appropriate the metaphor of Jacob and Esau that we used at the beginning to compare and contrast European and American approaches. When all is said and done, it may be the case that the Americans do organizational behavior like Esau, but have the belief system of Jacob, while the Europeans do organizational behavior like Jacob, and have the belief system of Esau. We invite our readers to continue in the open-ended dialogue that this volume represents.

NOTES

1. A good illustration of this in sociology is the example of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, who represented Germany and France at the signing of the Versailles treaty. Although these were arguably the two pre-eminent sociologists of their time, they did not cite each other!
2. Indeed, in the most ethnographic of American works (e.g., the Chicago school), it was the formalism of the ethnography that was important.
3. Rather than attempt to further explain Grandori's and Clegg's points of view about Crozier and Friedberg's importance to the field, we refer the reader to their respective chapters in this volume.
4. This suggests that a component of Crozier and Friedberg's work is rooted in the strong neo-Kantian tradition which we also find in Weber.
5. This is revealed by the fact that if you substituted the words "our model" for the words "the Japanese model," the title of Bonazzi's chapter would also work quite well as the title of Crozier and Friedberg's chapter.

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